Relentlessly Real. If it weren't for physics and law enforcement, I'd be unstoppable.
April 21, 2010
Financial Reform: A Test of the Tea Party's Character
Of late, I have made the case that Tea Party movement folks are unfairly described as obviously racist. At the same time I have been warming to the idea that the Tea Party by virtue of their anti-government stance are likely in the larger scheme of things to simply become the dupes of a corporatist agenda. The financial reform debate offers the opportunity to assess the Tea Party's rationality and to observe the character of the movement relative to issues of prejudice and race.
The Test of Rationality: The charge that CRA regulations caused the financial meltdown is false. Limbaugh, Hannity and Perino, all of whom pride themselves and those who listen to them as being informed, have no excuse not to know this charge to be false. Because it makes a good political talking point, they regurgitate the falsehood. Speaking plainly, they lie about the facts. Lets examine them. In 2009, two Federal Reserve Bank economists studied the data to test the claim. They explain:
The current crisis is rooted in the poor performance of mortgage loans made between 2005 and 2007. If the CRA did indeed spur the recent expansion of the subprime mortgage market and subsequent turmoil, it would be reasonable to assume that some change in the enforcement regime in 2004 or 2005 triggered a relaxation of underwriting standards by CRA-covered lenders for loans originated in the past few years. However, the CRA rules and enforcement process have not changed substantively since 1995
Got that? Loans made between 2005 and 2007 are the ones that caused all the trouble. If CRA were the cause of the problem, it would have been a change to its regulatory scheme made prior to the time period the problem subprime loans were originated. However, CRA has been essentially the same since 1995. The economists then make another important point, even more compelling than the first.
....independent nonbank lenders, such as mortgage and finance companies and credit unions, originate a substantial share of subprime mortgages, but they are not subject to CRA regulation and, hence, are not directly influenced by CRA obligations. Source
In case you missed it: the majority of subprime loans were issued by nonbank lenders that are not subject to CRA. The lenders who made bad loans with high fees and interest rates to risky borrowers and then turned around, packaged them up and sold them off, those lenders were not forced to do anything. They did it because it was profitable.
Combine the above with the originate-to-distribute model of complex instruments (securitization), investment banks playing carry trade (mismatched funding durations) with their balance sheets, relying on short term funding from money-market funds, and inadequate risk management models and you get the disaster we got.
A national study of the performance of banks covered by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), shows that these banks were much less likely than other lenders to make the kinds of risky, high-cost home purchase loans that helped fuel the foreclosure crisis. The average interest rate for CRA loans was much lower than other lenders. CRA banks were more than twice as likely as other lenders to keep the loans they write instead of selling them off to the highest bidder. The problem with subprime lending was that independent, unregulated lenders pushed inappropriate loans to some poor borrowers, but mostly to many American middle-class and wealthy consumers who could not qualify for loans under more stringent standards from non bank lenders (ie, not depositories-mortgage companies, finance holding companies, etc.) not covered by CRA. These loans were then sliced and diced into mortgage-backed securities by Wall Street investment houses that sold them to the financial institutions of the world. Then Wall Street started betting against these securitized debt obligations with credit default swaps and other complex instruments.
In summary, the notion that CRA caused the financial crisis is a lie not backed by the evidence, of which there is an ample amount. That information is readily available, you merely need go look for it. Rush, Hannity and Perino could do so, but why let facts get in the way? So the rationality test for the Tea Party is whether or not they are going to simply roll with the lie because it serves as more fuel for their anti-Obama, anti-government crusade, or actually operate based on the facts. If the Tea Party repeats this lie, their credibility as an authentic grassroots movement will in my mind be immediately suspect and they will be revealed as primarily motivated by anti-administration fervor.
The Test of Character: How the Tea Party responds to this lie will also give us the opportunity to examine the Tea Party's character as it relates to the issue of prejudice and race. The CRA lie draws its greatest potency from the fact that it plays into a stereotype image of poor minorities getting loans they didn't deserve for homes they could not afford. Its an unspoken but heavily suggested narrative undertone to this lie of blacks and latinos getting something for nothing at the expense of whites. Bounce around the interwebs and look at the comments left from those who believe this lie and its clear that they presume that these CRA loans went to minorities living in the inner cities of America. So not only is this a lie, but its a lie with a nasty little racial undertone to it. Is the Tea Party going to roll with that too? Or will they demonstrate enough discernment to reject this malicious falsehood and refuse to regurgitate the stereotype that fuels this lie?
Lastly, if the Tea Party establishes itself as against financial reform, when reform is urgently needed, its going to be hard to see that as anything but irrational opposition to the Obama administration, simply because they proposed it. If that turns out to be the case, the Tea Party will reveal itself to be little more than the unwitting dupes of corporatists.
January 14, 2010
The Obama Administration: A Schizophrenic Client State of the Banking Industry
Yves makes the case:
"While I cannot fathom the logic, Team Obama clearly decided to throw in its hat with the industry from the beginning, supporting a whole raft of tricks to keep banks from recognizing losses (heavens, might expose that some were bankrupt and require that incumbents be given the heave ho!). It also assisted in the “talk up the bank stocks” effort, since goosing prices would allow some banks to sell shares and save the new Administration the unpleasant task of figuring out how to resolve and recapitalize the sickest bank. It never seemed to occur to them that the best time for a President to take unpopular but productive action is at the start of his tenure. Nor did they anticipate that the public was not as dumb and inattentive as they assumed, and has taken notice of how the Administration has hitched its wagon to that of the plutocrats."
Yves's makes the point that keeps going unmentioned in much of the mainstream media coverage of banks who repaid TARP funds and the reports of improved performance by the industry.
"The banks got massive subsidies during and after the crisis; they continue now with the Fed’s super low rates and continued intervention in the mortgage markets (theoretically ending in March, but most informed observers expect the central bank to blink)."
Yves' goes on to point out that now the Obama administration is caught between a crock and a hard farce, being completely sold out to the industry with a body public suffering mightily while they watched the architects of the financial crisis grow fat by socializing the losses the administration is desperately working to keep them from recognizing on their books:
"The sketchy announcement du jour, that Obama will announce a $120 billion TARP fee this week (hhm, conveniently timed to distract attention from the start of the hearings into the crisis and Wall Street bonus announcements) illustrates the bizarre position the Administration is in. Alert readers may recall that Obama was touting the performance of the TARP at his Lehman anniversary speech in September. It repeated that palaver in December. As we noted then:
Both Obama and the Treasury Department keep talking up the TARP as if it is a money maker for taxpayers, when nothing could be further from the truth. Obama tried this stunt in his anniversary of Lehman speech, and the Treasury continues with the theme, of implying that results for the firms that paid back are representative of what the final results would be. If this logic were generally true, that would mean subprime bonds were a good investment too. After all, most borrowers did make good on their mortgages. A late September Moodys mortgage survey that a reader sent me estimated that total losses on subprime RMBS will be about 26%, which means that 74% were money good. The problem with the Treasury/Obama three card monte is that the strongest TARP are the ones that paid off first. Things can only go downhill from here. Do you expect AIG to repay the TARP in full? Or the auto companies?"Yves's succinctly sums up "the PR corner that Team Obama has painted itself in. It isn’t willing to do the UK thing and decry banker bonuses as irresponsible and unwarranted. It had Kenneth Feinberg, the pay czar, take a few scalps, but it was clear the Adminsitration had no intention of challenging the financial industry’s right to loot and pillage. It isn’t even willing to say the profits are due almost entirely to subsidies, hence a windfall profits tax (presumably one focused on capital markets operations, that’s where the real juice is) is in order. Heavens, that might lead chump investors to question bank valuations and sell stocks! Horrors, can’t have prices that reflect fundamentals when the Administration has been pointing to the improvement in the financial markets as proof its policies are working.So the finesse is now to admit, in a reversal of its recent posturing, that yes Virginia, the TARP is losing money"
The Obama administration is selling fake economic recovery fumes as though they were the aroma of an energetically healing economy, talking up improved bank performance in some quarters. Really? The Fed is selling banks money at effectively zero percent interest, which they are relending at 5% and up. That's a little bit of arbitrage my 7 year old Noah could do. On top of that, the executive is using the Treasury, the Fed, the tax code and every tool at their disposal to prevent banks from recognizing losses and help them recapitalize (capital they then hoard or do acquisitions with, not lend). When the government is actually forcing you to take money (TARP) and finding any way it can to subsidize your industry, its hard not to make a few bucks. But Americans aren't stupid and the Obama administration is at some point going to run out of room to play both sides of the economic blame game.
April 20, 2009
Banks Reporting Profits: Are You Kidding Me?
Update: Oh yeah, I forgot to mention that banks are also borrowing from the Fed at 0% and selling at 4-7%. Again, give me some of that action and I'll turn a profit too.
April 4, 2009
The Obama Adminstration Is Covering Up The Truth
Bill Moyers sat down with William K. Black, the former senior regulator who cracked down on banks during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Black offers his analysis of what went wrong and his critique of the bailout. See the video here. I am convinced at this point that the Obama administration is going completely wrong on this financial crisis. Republicans, rather than engaging in unconstructive snark, should be fighting hard to expose the fraud thats going on here. However, GOP lawmakers are complicit too in the perpetuation of this fraud thats going on. We may be screwed.I supported Obama and I think for all of us who did, its necessary to push back on him very, very hard now. This thing is not unsalvalgeable.
April 3, 2009
BILL MOYERS: Welcome to the Journal.
For months now, revelations of the wholesale greed and blatant transgressions of Wall Street have reminded us that "The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One." In fact, the man you're about to meet wrote a book with just that title. It was based upon his experience as a tough regulator during one of the darkest chapters in our financial history: the savings and loan scandal in the late 1980s.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: These numbers as large as they are, vastly understate the problem of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Bill Black was in New York this week for a conference at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice where scholars and journalists gathered to ask the question, "How do they get away with it?" Well, no one has asked that question more often than Bill Black.
The former Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention now teaches Economics and Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. During the savings and loan crisis, it was Black who accused then-house speaker Jim Wright and five US Senators, including John Glenn and John McCain, of doing favors for the S&L's in exchange for contributions and other perks. The senators got off with a slap on the wrist, but so enraged was one of those bankers, Charles Keating — after whom the senate's so-called "Keating Five" were named — he sent a memo that read, in part, "get Black — kill him dead." Metaphorically, of course. Of course.
Now Black is focused on an even greater scandal, and he spares no one — not even the President he worked hard to elect, Barack Obama. But his main targets are the Wall Street barons, heirs of an earlier generation whose scandalous rip-offs of wealth back in the 1930s earned them comparison to Al Capone and the mob, and the nickname "banksters."
Bill Black, welcome to the Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you.
BILL MOYERS: I was taken with your candor at the conference here in New York to hear you say that this crisis we're going through, this economic and financial meltdown is driven by fraud. What's your definition of fraud?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Fraud is deceit. And the essence of fraud is, "I create trust in you, and then I betray that trust, and get you to give me something of value." And as a result, there's no more effective acid against trust than fraud, especially fraud by top elites, and that's what we have.
BILL MOYERS: In your book, you make it clear that calculated dishonesty by people in charge is at the heart of most large corporate failures and scandals, including, of course, the S&L, but is that true? Is that what you're saying here, that it was in the boardrooms and the CEO offices where this fraud began?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: How did they do it? What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, the way that you do it is to make really bad loans, because they pay better. Then you grow extremely rapidly, in other words, you're a Ponzi-like scheme. And the third thing you do is we call it leverage. That just means borrowing a lot of money, and the combination creates a situation where you have guaranteed record profits in the early years. That makes you rich, through the bonuses that modern executive compensation has produced. It also makes it inevitable that there's going to be a disaster down the road.
BILL MOYERS: So you're suggesting, saying that CEOs of some of these banks and mortgage firms in order to increase their own personal income, deliberately set out to make bad loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: How do they get away with it? I mean, what about their own checks and balances in the company? What about their accounting divisions?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: All of those checks and balances report to the CEO, so if the CEO goes bad, all of the checks and balances are easily overcome. And the art form is not simply to defeat those internal controls, but to suborn them, to turn them into your greatest allies. And the bonus programs are exactly how you do that.
BILL MOYERS: If I wanted to go looking for the parties to this, with a good bird dog, where would you send me?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that's exactly what hasn't happened. We haven't looked, all right? The Bush Administration essentially got rid of regulation, so if nobody was looking, you were able to do this with impunity and that's exactly what happened. Where would you look? You'd look at the specialty lenders. The lenders that did almost all of their work in the sub-prime and what's called Alt-A, liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Liars' loans--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: Why did they call them liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they were liars' loans.
BILL MOYERS: And they knew it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They knew it. They knew that they were frauds.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Liars' loans mean that we don't check. You tell us what your income is. You tell us what your job is. You tell us what your assets are, and we agree to believe you. We won't check on any of those things. And by the way, you get a better deal if you inflate your income and your job history and your assets.
BILL MOYERS: You think they really said that to borrowers?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We know that they said that to borrowers. In fact, they were also called, in the trade, ninja loans.
BILL MOYERS: Ninja?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yeah, because no income verification, no job verification, no asset verification.
BILL MOYERS: You're talking about significant American companies.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Huge! One company produced as many losses as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: Which company?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: IndyMac specialized in making liars' loans. In 2006 alone, it sold $80 billion dollars of liars' loans to other companies. $80 billion.
BILL MOYERS: And was this happening exclusively in this sub-prime mortgage business?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: No, and that's a big part of the story as well. Even prime loans began to have non-verification. Even Ronald Reagan, you know, said, "Trust, but verify." They just gutted the verification process. We know that will produce enormous fraud, under economic theory, criminology theory, and two thousand years of life experience.
BILL MOYERS: Is it possible that these complex instruments were deliberately created so swindlers could exploit them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, absolutely. This stuff, the exotic stuff that you're talking about was created out of things like liars' loans, that were known to be extraordinarily bad. And now it was getting triple-A ratings. Now a triple-A rating is supposed to mean there is zero credit risk. So you take something that not only has significant, it has crushing risk. That's why it's toxic. And you create this fiction that it has zero risk. That itself, of course, is a fraudulent exercise. And again, there was nobody looking, during the Bush years. So finally, only a year ago, we started to have a Congressional investigation of some of these rating agencies, and it's scandalous what came out. What we know now is that the rating agencies never looked at a single loan file. When they finally did look, after the markets had completely collapsed, they found, and I'm quoting Fitch, the smallest of the rating agencies, "the results were disconcerting, in that there was the appearance of fraud in nearly every file we examined."
BILL MOYERS: So if your assumption is correct, your evidence is sound, the bank, the lending company, created a fraud. And the ratings agency that is supposed to test the value of these assets knowingly entered into the fraud. Both parties are committing fraud by intention.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right, and the investment banker that — we call it pooling — puts together these bad mortgages, these liars' loans, and creates the toxic waste of these derivatives. All of them do that. And then they sell it to the world and the world just thinks because it has a triple-A rating it must actually be safe. Well, instead, there are 60 and 80 percent losses on these things, because of course they, in reality, are toxic waste.
BILL MOYERS: You're describing what Bernie Madoff did to a limited number of people. But you're saying it's systemic, a systemic Ponzi scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Oh, Bernie was a piker. He doesn't even get into the front ranks of a Ponzi scheme...
BILL MOYERS: But you're saying our system became a Ponzi scheme.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Our system...
BILL MOYERS: Our financial system...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Became a Ponzi scheme. Everybody was buying a pig in the poke. But they were buying a pig in the poke with a pretty pink ribbon, and the pink ribbon said, "Triple-A."
BILL MOYERS: Is there a law against liars' loans?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not directly, but there, of course, many laws against fraud, and liars' loans are fraudulent.
BILL MOYERS: Because...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they're not going to be repaid and because they had false representations. They involve deceit, which is the essence of fraud.
BILL MOYERS: Why is it so hard to prosecute? Why hasn't anyone been brought to justice over this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because they didn't even begin to investigate the major lenders until the market had actually collapsed, which is completely contrary to what we did successfully in the Savings and Loan crisis, right? Even while the institutions were reporting they were the most profitable savings and loan in America, we knew they were frauds. And we were moving to close them down. Here, the Justice Department, even though it very appropriately warned, in 2004, that there was an epidemic...
BILL MOYERS: Who did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The FBI publicly warned, in September 2004 that there was an epidemic of mortgage fraud, that if it was allowed to continue it would produce a crisis at least as large as the Savings and Loan debacle. And that they were going to make sure that they didn't let that happen. So what goes wrong? After 9/11, the attacks, the Justice Department transfers 500 white-collar specialists in the FBI to national terrorism. Well, we can all understand that. But then, the Bush administration refused to replace the missing 500 agents. So even today, again, as you say, this crisis is 1000 times worse, perhaps, certainly 100 times worse, than the Savings and Loan crisis. There are one-fifth as many FBI agents as worked the Savings and Loan crisis.
BILL MOYERS: You talk about the Bush administration. Of course, there's that famous photograph of some of the regulators in 2003, who come to a press conference with a chainsaw suggesting that they're going to slash, cut business loose from regulation, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, they succeeded. And in that picture, by the way, the other — three of the other guys with pruning shears are the...
BILL MOYERS: That's right.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They're the trade representatives. They're the lobbyists for the bankers. And everybody's grinning. The government's working together with the industry to destroy regulation. Well, we now know what happens when you destroy regulation. You get the biggest financial calamity of anybody under the age of 80.
BILL MOYERS: But I can point you to statements by Larry Summers, who was then Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Treasury, or the other Clinton Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin. I can point you to suspects in both parties, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There were two really big things, under the Clinton administration. One, they got rid of the law that came out of the real-world disasters of the Great Depression. We learned a lot of things in the Great Depression. And one is we had to separate what's called commercial banking from investment banking. That's the Glass-Steagall law. But we thought we were much smarter, supposedly. So we got rid of that law, and that was bipartisan. And the other thing is we passed a law, because there was a very good regulator, Brooksley Born, that everybody should know about and probably doesn't. She tried to do the right thing to regulate one of these exotic derivatives that you're talking about. We call them C.D.F.S. And Summers, Rubin, and Phil Gramm came together to say not only will we block this particular regulation. We will pass a law that says you can't regulate. And it's this type of derivative that is most involved in the AIG scandal. AIG all by itself, cost the same as the entire Savings and Loan debacle.
BILL MOYERS: What did AIG contribute? What did they do wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They made bad loans. Their type of loan was to sell a guarantee, right? And they charged a lot of fees up front. So, they booked a lot of income. Paid enormous bonuses. The bonuses we're thinking about now, they're much smaller than these bonuses that were also the product of accounting fraud. And they got very, very rich. But, of course, then they had guaranteed this toxic waste. These liars' loans. Well, we've just gone through why those toxic waste, those liars' loans, are going to have enormous losses. And so, you have to pay the guarantee on those enormous losses. And you go bankrupt. Except that you don't in the modern world, because you've come to the United States, and the taxpayers play the fool. Under Secretary Geithner and under Secretary Paulson before him... we took $5 billion dollars, for example, in U.S. taxpayer money. And sent it to a huge Swiss Bank called UBS. At the same time that that bank was defrauding the taxpayers of America. And we were bringing a criminal case against them. We eventually get them to pay a $780 million fine, but wait, we gave them $5 billion. So, the taxpayers of America paid the fine of a Swiss Bank. And why are we bailing out somebody who that is defrauding us?
BILL MOYERS: And why...
WILLIAM K. BLACK: How mad is this?
BILL MOYERS: What is your explanation for why the bankers who created this mess are still calling the shots?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, that, especially after what's just happened at G.M., that's... it's scandalous.
BILL MOYERS: Why are they firing the president of G.M. and not firing the head of all these banks that are involved?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There are two reasons. One, they're much closer to the bankers. These are people from the banking industry. And they have a lot more sympathy. In fact, they're outright hostile to autoworkers, as you can see. They want to bash all of their contracts. But when they get to banking, they say, ‘contracts, sacred.' But the other element of your question is we don't want to change the bankers, because if we do, if we put honest people in, who didn't cause the problem, their first job would be to find the scope of the problem. And that would destroy the cover up.
BILL MOYERS: The cover up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Sure. The cover up.
BILL MOYERS: That's a serious charge.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Of course.
BILL MOYERS: Who's covering up?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Geithner is charging, is covering up. Just like Paulson did before him. Geithner is publicly saying that it's going to take $2 trillion — a trillion is a thousand billion — $2 trillion taxpayer dollars to deal with this problem. But they're allowing all the banks to report that they're not only solvent, but fully capitalized. Both statements can't be true. It can't be that they need $2 trillion, because they have masses losses, and that they're fine.
These are all people who have failed. Paulson failed, Geithner failed. They were all promoted because they failed, not because...
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, Geithner has, was one of our nation's top regulators, during the entire subprime scandal, that I just described. He took absolutely no effective action. He gave no warning. He did nothing in response to the FBI warning that there was an epidemic of fraud. All this pig in the poke stuff happened under him. So, in his phrase about legacy assets. Well he's a failed legacy regulator.
BILL MOYERS: But he denies that he was a regulator. Let me show you some of his testimony before Congress. Take a look at this.
TIMOTHY GEITHNER:I've never been a regulator, for better or worse. And I think you're right to say that we have to be very skeptical that regulation can solve all of these problems. We have parts of our system that are overwhelmed by regulation.
Overwhelmed by regulation! It wasn't the absence of regulation that was the problem, it was despite the presence of regulation you've got huge risks that build up.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, he may be right that he never regulated, but his job was to regulate. That was his mission statement.
BILL MOYERS: As?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: As president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which is responsible for regulating most of the largest bank holding companies in America. And he's completely wrong that we had too much regulation in some of these areas. I mean, he gives no details, obviously. But that's just plain wrong.
BILL MOYERS: How is this happening? I mean why is it happening?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Until you get the facts, it's harder to blow all this up. And, of course, the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts.
BILL MOYERS: What facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The facts about how bad the condition of the banks is. So, as long as I keep the old CEO who caused the problems, is he going to go vigorously around finding the problems? Finding the frauds?
BILL MOYERS: You--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Taking away people's bonuses?
BILL MOYERS: To hear you say this is unusual because you supported Barack Obama, during the campaign. But you're seeming disillusioned now.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, certainly in the financial sphere, I am. I think, first, the policies are substantively bad. Second, I think they completely lack integrity. Third, they violate the rule of law. This is being done just like Secretary Paulson did it. In violation of the law. We adopted a law after the Savings and Loan crisis, called the Prompt Corrective Action Law. And it requires them to close these institutions. And they're refusing to obey the law.
BILL MOYERS: In other words, they could have closed these banks without nationalizing them?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, you do a receivership. No one -- Ronald Reagan did receiverships. Nobody called it nationalization.
BILL MOYERS: And that's a law?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's the law.
BILL MOYERS: So, Paulson could have done this? Geithner could do this?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Not could. Was mandated--
BILL MOYERS: By the law.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: By the law.
BILL MOYERS: This law, you're talking about.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: What the reason they give for not doing it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: They ignore it. And nobody calls them on it.
BILL MOYERS: Well, where's Congress? Where's the press? Where--
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, where's the Pecora investigation?
BILL MOYERS: The what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: The Pecora investigation. The Great Depression, we said, "Hey, we have to learn the facts. What caused this disaster, so that we can take steps, like pass the Glass-Steagall law, that will prevent future disasters?" Where's our investigation?
What would happen if after a plane crashes, we said, "Oh, we don't want to look in the past. We want to be forward looking. Many people might have been, you know, we don't want to pass blame. No. We have a nonpartisan, skilled inquiry. We spend lots of money on, get really bright people. And we find out, to the best of our ability, what caused every single major plane crash in America. And because of that, aviation has an extraordinarily good safety record. We ought to follow the same policies in the financial sphere. We have to find out what caused the disasters, or we will keep reliving them. And here, we've got a double tragedy. It isn't just that we are failing to learn from the mistakes of the past. We're failing to learn from the successes of the past.
BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: In the Savings and Loan debacle, we developed excellent ways for dealing with the frauds, and for dealing with the failed institutions. And for 15 years after the Savings and Loan crisis, didn't matter which party was in power, the U.S. Treasury Secretary would fly over to Tokyo and tell the Japanese, "You ought to do things the way we did in the Savings and Loan crisis, because it worked really well. Instead you're covering up the bank losses, because you know, you say you need confidence. And so, we have to lie to the people to create confidence. And it doesn't work. You will cause your recession to continue and continue." And the Japanese call it the lost decade. That was the result. So, now we get in trouble, and what do we do? We adopt the Japanese approach of lying about the assets. And you know what? It's working just as well as it did in Japan.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah. Are you saying that Timothy Geithner, the Secretary of the Treasury, and others in the administration, with the banks, are engaged in a cover up to keep us from knowing what went wrong?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely.
BILL MOYERS: You are.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Absolutely, because they are scared to death. All right? They're scared to death of a collapse. They're afraid that if they admit the truth, that many of the large banks are insolvent. They think Americans are a bunch of cowards, and that we'll run screaming to the exits. And we won't rely on deposit insurance. And, by the way, you can rely on deposit insurance. And it's foolishness. All right? Now, it may be worse than that. You can impute more cynical motives. But I think they are sincerely just panicked about, "We just can't let the big banks fail." That's wrong.
BILL MOYERS: But what might happen, at this point, if in fact they keep from us the true health of the banks?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Well, then the banks will, as they did in Japan, either stay enormously weak, or Treasury will be forced to increasingly absurd giveaways of taxpayer money. We've seen how horrific AIG -- and remember, they kept secrets from everyone.
BILL MOYERS: A.I.G. did?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: What we're doing with -- no, Treasury and both administrations. The Bush administration and now the Obama administration kept secret from us what was being done with AIG. AIG was being used secretly to bail out favored banks like UBS and like Goldman Sachs. Secretary Paulson's firm, that he had come from being CEO. It got the largest amount of money. $12.9 billion. And they didn't want us to know that. And it was only Congressional pressure, and not Congressional pressure, by the way, on Geithner, but Congressional pressure on AIG.
Where Congress said, "We will not give you a single penny more unless we know who received the money." And, you know, when he was Treasury Secretary, Paulson created a recommendation group to tell Treasury what they ought to do with AIG. And he put Goldman Sachs on it.
BILL MOYERS: Even though Goldman Sachs had a big vested stake.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive stake. And even though he had just been CEO of Goldman Sachs before becoming Treasury Secretary. Now, in most stages in American history, that would be a scandal of such proportions that he wouldn't be allowed in civilized society.
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, like a conflict of interest, it seems.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Massive conflict of interests.
BILL MOYERS: So, how did he get away with it?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: I don't know whether we've lost our capability of outrage. Or whether the cover up has been so successful that people just don't have the facts to react to it.
BILL MOYERS: Who's going to get the facts?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: We need some chairmen or chairwomen--
BILL MOYERS: In Congress.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: --in Congress, to hold the necessary hearings. And we can blast this out. But if you leave the failed CEOs in place, it isn't just that they're terrible business people, though they are. It isn't just that they lack integrity, though they do. Because they were engaged in these frauds. But they're not going to disclose the truth about the assets.
BILL MOYERS: And we have to know that, in order to know what?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: To know everything. To know who committed the frauds. Whose bonuses we should recover. How much the assets are worth. How much they should be sold for. Is the bank insolvent, such that we should resolve it in this way? It's the predicate, right? You need to know the facts to make intelligent decisions. And they're deliberately leaving in place the people that caused the problem, because they don't want the facts. And this is not new. The Reagan Administration's central priority, at all times, during the Savings and Loan crisis, was covering up the losses.
BILL MOYERS: So, you're saying that people in power, political power, and financial power, act in concert when their own behinds are in the ringer, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: That's right. And it's particularly a crisis that brings this out, because then the class of the banker says, "You've got to keep the information away from the public or everything will collapse. If they understand how bad it is, they'll run for the exits."
BILL MOYERS: Yeah, and this week in New York, at this conference, you described this as more than a financial crisis. You called it a moral crisis.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Yes.
BILL MOYERS: Why?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Because it is a fundamental lack of integrity. But also because, if you look back at crises, an economist who is also a presidential appointee, as a regulator in the Savings and Loan industry, right here in New York, Larry White, wrote a book about the Savings and Loan crisis. And he said, you know, one of the most interesting questions is why so few people engaged in fraud? Because objectively, you could have gotten away with it. But only about ten percent of the CEOs, engaged in fraud. So, 90 percent of them were restrained by ethics and integrity. So, far more than law or by F.B.I. agents, it's our integrity that often prevents the greatest abuses. And what we had in this crisis, instead of the Savings and Loan, is the most elite institutions in America engaging or facilitating fraud.
BILL MOYERS: This wound that you say has been inflicted on American life. The loss of worker's income. And security and pensions and future happened, because of the misconduct of a relatively few, very well-heeled people, in very well-decorated corporate suites, right?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Right.
BILL MOYERS: It was relatively a handful of people.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: And their ideologies, which swept away regulation. So, in the example, regulation means that cheaters don't prosper. So, instead of being bad for capitalism, it's what saves capitalism. "Honest purveyors prosper" is what we want. And you need regulation and law enforcement to be able to do this. The tragedy of this crisis is it didn't need to happen at all.
BILL MOYERS: When you wake in the middle of the night, thinking about your work, what do you make of that? What do you tell yourself?
WILLIAM K. BLACK: There's a saying that we took great comfort in. It's actually by the Dutch, who were fighting this impossible war for independence against what was then the most powerful nation in the world, Spain. And their motto was, "It is not necessary to hope in order to persevere."
Now, going forward, get rid of the people that have caused the problems. That's a pretty straightforward thing, as well. Why would we keep CEOs and CFOs and other senior officers, that caused the problems? That's facially nuts. That's our current system.
So stop that current system. We're hiding the losses, instead of trying to find out the real losses. Stop that, because you need good information to make good decisions, right? Follow what works instead of what's failed. Start appointing people who have records of success, instead of records of failure. That would be another nice place to start. There are lots of things we can do. Even today, as late as it is. Even though they've had a terrible start to the administration. They could change, and they could change within weeks. And by the way, the folks who are the better regulators, they paid their taxes. So, you can get them through the vetting process a lot quicker.
BILL MOYERS: William Black, thank you very much for being with me on the Journal.
WILLIAM K. BLACK: Thank you so much.December 20, 2007
The Mortgage Crisis, Part 1: When too much of a good thing, isn’t.
An Analysis of the Mortgage Crisis from my colleague David Dworkin at Affiniti Network StrategiesIf you've been waiting for the mortgage crisis to hit bottom, get yourself a couple of good books, because it's going to be a while, well into 2009 or 2010 at least. Count on it getting a lot worse before it gets better, and even that may be a rosy scenario if Congress passes bad legislation in an election-year panic.
Recent studies estimate over 1 million additional families will lose their homes over the next six years, due solely to subprime mortgages made between 2004-2006. And every time a home goes into foreclosure, the other homes on their block depreciate an average of $5000. To complete the viscous cycle, for every 1 percent reduction in home value, twice as many homes will fall into a negative equity position, where the mortgage is for more money than the house is worth and 70,000 of them will go into foreclosure. (source: First American CoreLogic, Inc. http://www.corelogic.com/)
Like all crises, everyone wants to know four things:
- Who's to blame?
- When is it going to end?
- How did we get in this mess?
- How do we get out of this mess?
In the next two entries in The Leading Edge, I'll try to answer three of these questions in plain English. I will not try to assign blame. It is human nature to identify responsibility when something bad happens. This reassures us somehow that justice has been done and we are safe from more bad things happening to us. A crisis of this scope requires lots of cooperation. While there are many truly innocent victims, there are many more who went into this with their eyes wide shut. Take your pick: lenders (including mortgage banks, commercial banks, S&L's and mortgage brokers), rating agencies, the Administration and Congress, GSE's, and consumers as well.
Homeownership is tremendously important and has broad community benefits, but only when it is done responsibly. The perception that everyone should be a homeowner runs into trouble when nearly everyone who should be a homeowner is one. By 2004, the national homeownership rate was over 69 percent. Interest rates were low and the entire economy benefited as the technology boom of the 1990's was replaced by the housing boom. No one had any interest in downshifting. Besides, housing had become a critical part of the overall national economy and a lot of the new home equity generated by rising home values was being spent to support it. Slowing down the housing market became synonymous with slowing down the nation.
To keep the mortgage market and housing machines running, mortgage underwriting (the rules that help ensure we buy homes we can afford), became a useful tool to expand historic growth even further. Loosen up on the rules, and more people can get on for the ride. The balloon metaphor is useful because the same air that fills up a balloon and makes it functional can also burst it. And that's exactly what happened with mortgage underwriting standards. Books will be written about the many "exotic" and "hybrid" mortgage products that contributed to this crisis, but the one product that has done the most harm is the "2-28".
A typical mortgage is a contract to repay a debt over 30 years. Most mortgages in the US are 30 year "fixed rate" mortgages. That means that you pay the same "fixed" interest rate every year, and your payment is the same every month. An adjustable rate mortgage, more common in the rest of the world, adjusts the mortgage interest payment to the market rate on an annual and sometimes monthly basis.
The difference comes down to who is taking the risk that interest rates will go up and down. In an adjustable mortgage, the consumer takes most of the interest rate risk because the mortgage payment changes with the market. When rates go down, the payment is less. When rates go up, the payment is more. With a fixed rate mortgage, the payment stays the same when rates go up, and they can refinance into a new mortgage when rates go down. An adjustable rate is better for banks, but only as long as most consumers are able to afford their mortgage when rates rise.
As a result of this risk imbalance between the two choices, the market usually makes adjustable rate mortgages cheaper than fixed-rate mortgages. From time to time, complicated factors reverse this trend, and the rates are pretty similar or even the reverse. But this time, lenders who made a lot of adjustable rate mortgages, which are more profitable for them, made some key changes to how the interest is calculated and how buyers were qualified.
Borrowers are qualified on their ability to make the first payment, not the 25th payment. So lenders began offering mortgages with "teaser" or introductory rates that were a lot less than the interest rate that would be paid after the two year teaser period ended. In some cases, the teaser rate ended in a few months, but the payment stayed the same for two years while the shortfall (the difference between what the payment was and what the payment should be) was paid by the borrower in home equity - the small part of the home they actually owned. Teaser rates were sometimes less than 2% in a 6% market. Homeowners were qualified based on this rate, even though it would adjust after two years to a much higher rate.
That's why many lenders privately referred to these loans as lender crack. They knew these loans would kill them eventually, but they couldn't stop because they were addicted to the revenue and volume they generated. How much volume? Between 2003 and 2006, lenders originated 1.12 million loans with initial interest rates of less than 2 percent - $431 billion in credit. But these are just the worst of the worst. Nearly 60% of all adjustable rate mortgages originated in 2004-2006 will have payments reset more than 25% of their original amount. For a $300,000 mortgage with a 1% teaser rate, that means a payment increase from $965 per month to $1896 per month at the prevailing interest rate of 6.5%. (source: First American CoreLogic)
For low- and moderate-income consumers, this mortgage almost guarantees foreclosure. If you have plenty of cash, and have high yield investments, this kind of a mortgage may be a good deal. But for first time homebuyers, or those on limited or fixed incomes, it's financial Russian roulette with five rounds in the chamber. A low- or moderate-income homebuyer, who can't afford the increased interest rate now, is not going to be able to afford it in two years. When the biggest raise you've ever received was 10% and your mortgage payment goes up 50%, you're going to lose your home.
And that brings us to when this crisis is going to end. If you're an optimist, late 2009 is probably a good target. If you're a pessimist, tack on another year or two. Until then, if you see any light at the end of the tunnel step aside, because it's probably another train.
Foreclosures will continue to increase as more of the 2-28's reset. When resets peak in March of 2008, we will be approaching the beginning of the end. But remember, those homeowners will just be starting the process of getting behind on the payments. They won't loose their homes for another 6-12 months, depending on the state in which they live. That means that the real estate market in most states will be glutted in the spring of 2009. As that inventory is absorbed (or in the case of some urban neighborhoods, demolished), the market will finally bottom out. Personally, I don't know how much value my home will lose, but I am quite sure it won't appreciate another dollar until 2010.
