Relentlessly Real. If it weren't for physics and law enforcement, I'd be unstoppable.
October 3, 2011
Perry's Rock
July 12, 2011
Slavery on the Collective Conservative Mind
The FAMiLY Leader, a public advocacy organization affiliated with the Iowa Family Policy Center, is the latest conservative entity to indulge in this dig at black political gullibility. They recently issued the Marriage Vow, a declaration of principles adherence to marriage and family values and have wasted no time asking GOP candidates to sign it. Several have, with Michelle Bachman being the candidate who got called out for missing the little racial bomblet in the pledge, to wit:
Slavery had a disastrous impact on African-American families, yet sadly a child born into slavery in 1860 was more likely to be raised by his mother and father in a two-parent household than was an African-American baby born after the election of the USA‟s first African-American President.3
It's worth pointing out that the Family Leader actually footnoted the above mentioned conclusion with a reference to the work of a group of academics hailing from colleges including Morehouse and Hampton, with a contribution from Lorraine Blackman hailing from right here at the Indiana University School of Social Work. I've read through the report, somewhat ominously titled The Consequences of Marriage for African Americans. Based on my read of it, the Family Leader drew the above conclusion from this statement on page 8.
But overall, family formation patterns were relatively similar for Blacks and Whites, with marriage occupying a paramount place in family life. For example, in 1880 and 1910 about 56.3 percent of Black and 66.9 percent of White households were nuclear households,
Bachman caught flack for signing onto the pledge, on the grounds that this passage in the pledge suggests that there was actually something beneficial for blacks families in the institution of slavery. The Jack & Jill Politics blog bluntly called out this passage as using slavery as a cheap emotional hook to make a political point. I agree with that.
Intellectual conservative Jedi master Cobb (I say that with sincere respect) opines " You have a conservative group trying to say something reasonable and putting black families in the focus and it is being shot down by idiots."
My take? I don't buy for a minute that the Family Leader was attempting to put black families in the focus. You know that is not the case when you consider the target audience of the pledge, which is conservative base GOP voters. The candidates are signing on to the pledge in order to curry favor with that portion of the electorate. This is not a document that was intended to be spread around in the black community, nor written with them in mind.
Ham handed invocations of slavery like this one are proof positive that both the GOP leadership and rank and file still do not regard blacks as a political constituency necessary or essential to their aspirations for governance. If we did, we would figure out the right communication and enforce some goddamn messaging discipline just like we do for all other messaging we think is important. Its just not that hard. Because the GOP doesn't really give a damn about blacks as a political constituency, we continue to be subjected to unforced errors like this. Lazy, small bore attacks that aspire to depress a portion of the black vote by demoralizing attrition, all the while deriving what I can't help but believe is a certain savage subconscious satisfaction at rubbing the incompetence of the first African American president in the black communities' collective face.
Since you're already here: New economy dynamics are leaving at risk youth behind. Get the Grant in a Box: Hi-tech Entrepreneurship@ Concept Paper 1.0 and do something about it.
February 16, 2009
Obama's Emerging Foreign Policy

Clinton’s Asian expedition is not the first overseas visit by a key member of the new administration. Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference, where he faced the Russians. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell has finished his first trip to his area of responsibility, and is already planning a return visit to the Middle East. And Richard Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, has visited both South Asian countries in addition to making a “listening” stop in India.
The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy
As with any new U.S. presidency, there will be a period of reshaping policy, of setting priorities, and of balancing internal differences within the Obama administration. The various individuals and visits cataloged above in part reflect the Obama administration’s emerging foreign policy.
A two-pronged Obama foreign policy approach is unfolding. The first prong, relating to the general tenor of foreign relations, involves a modern application of the “speak softly and carry a big stick” approach. The second prong, relating to the distribution of power within the administration, involves a centralization of foreign policy centering on a stronger and expanded National Security Council (NSC) and relies on special envoys for crisis areas, leaving the secretary of state to shape foreign perceptions rather than policy.
The Obama administration faced mixed expectations as it came into office. Perhaps the most far-reaching expectation on the international front was the idea that the Obama administration would somehow be the antithesis of the previous Bush administration. Whereas Bush often was portrayed as a unilateralist “cowboy,” constantly confronting others and never listening to allies (much less competitors), it was thought that Obama somehow would remake America into a nation that withheld its military power and instead confronted international relations via consultations and cooperation. In essence, the Bush administration was seen as aggressive and unwilling to listen, while an Obama administration was expected to be more easily shaped and manipulated.
Anticipation of a weaker administration created a challenge for Obama from the start. While many of his supporters saw him as the anti-Bush, the new president had no intention of shifting America to a second-tier position or making the United States isolationist. Obama’s focus on reducing U.S. forces in Iraq and the discussions during Clinton’s confirmation hearing of reducing the military’s role in reconstruction operations did not reflect an anti-military bias or even new ideas, but something Defense Secretary Robert Gates had advocated for under former U.S. President George W. Bush. A reshaping of the U.S. military will in fact take place over the course of Obama’s term in office. But the decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq is not unique to this administration; it is merely a recognition of the reality of the limitations of military resources.
Diplomacy and Military Power
The new administration has applied this decision as the basis of a strategy to refocus the military on its core competencies and rebuild the military’s strength and readiness, using that as the strong and stable framework from which to pursue an apparently more cooperative foreign policy. U.S. diplomatic power needs a strong military, and operations in Iraq have drained U.S. military power — something highlighted by the U.S. inability to act on its policies when the Russians moved in on Georgia.
It is not only U.S. political power that is reinforced by military power, but U.S. economic strength as well. Control of the world’s sea-lanes — and increasingly, control of outer space — is what ensures the security of U.S. economic links abroad. In theory, the United States can thus interdict competitors’ supply lines and economic ties while protecting its own.
Despite globalization and greater economic ties, physical power still remains the strongest backer to diplomacy. Ideology alone will not change the world, much less the actions of so-called rogue states or even pirates along the Somali coast. The first principal of Obama’s foreign policy, then, will be making sure it has big stick to carry, one freed from long-term reconstruction commitments or seemingly intractable situations such as Iraq. Only with an available and effective military can one afford to speak softly without being trod upon.
Rebuilding U.S. military readiness and strength is not going to be easy. Iraq and Afghanistan remain to be taken care of, and there are years of heavy activity and at times declining recruitment to recover from. While there are substantial benefits to a battle-hardened military accustomed to a high deployment tempo, this also has its costs — reset costs will be high. A very real domestic military shake-up looms on the one- to two-year horizon in order to bring the Pentagon back into line with fiscal and procurement realities, coupled with concerns about midlevel officer retention. But the Pentagon’s thinking and strategic guidance already have moved toward cooperative security and toward working more closely with allies and partners to stabilize and manage the global security environment, with an emphasis on requiring foreign participation and burden-sharing.
A Greater Security Role for Allies and a Centralized Foreign Policy
Obama will also work on managing the U.S. image abroad. Opposition to Bush and opposition to the war in Iraq often became synonymous internationally, evolving intentionally or otherwise into broader anti-war and anti-military sentiments. Rebuilding the military’s image internationally will not happen overnight. Part of the process will involve using the sense of change inherent in any new U.S. administration to push allies and others to take on a greater role in global security.
In Asia, for example, Clinton will call on Tokyo and Seoul to step up operations in Afghanistan, particularly in reconstruction and development efforts. But Tokyo and Seoul also will be called on to take a greater role in regional security — Seoul on the Korean Peninsula and Tokyo as a more active military ally overall. The same message will be sent to Europe and elsewhere: If you want a multilateral United States, you will have to take up the slack and participate in multilateral operations. The multilateral mantra will not be one in which the United States does what others say, but rather one in which the United States holds others to the task. In the end, this will reduce U.S. commitments abroad, allowing the military to refocus on its core competencies and rebuild its strength.
A strong military thus forms the foundation of any foreign policy. Obama’s foreign policy approach is largely centralized in a bid for a wider approach. Taking China as an example, for the last half-dozen years, U.S. policy on China was based almost entirely on economics. The U.S. Treasury Department took the lead in China relations, while other issues — everything from Chinese military developments to Beijing’s growing presence in Africa and Latin America to human rights — took a back seat. While the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (or something similar) will remain a major pillar of U.S.-China relations under Obama, equally important parallel tracks will focus on military and security issues, nontraditional threats, politics and human rights. This multifaceted approach will require close co operation among numerous departments and divisions to avoid the chaos seen in things like U.S. policy on North Korea.
This coordination will take place in an expanded NSC, one that brings in the economic elements on equal footing with security and political concerns. Combined with the appointment of special envoys for critical regions, this is intended to ensure a more unified and complete approach to foreign policy. This way, Obama retains oversight over policy, while his erstwhile rival Clinton is just one voice at the table. The State Department’s role thus becomes more about image management and development.
Accordingly, Clinton’s foreign travels are less about shaping foreign policy than shaping foreign images of the United States. She is demonstrating the new consultative nature of the administration by going everywhere and listening to everyone. Meanwhile, the hard-hitting foreign policy initiatives go to the special envoys, who can dedicate their time and energy to just one topic. Holbrooke got South Asia, Mitchell got the Middle East, and there are indications that managing overall China strategy will fall to Biden, at least in the near term.
Other special envoys and special representatives might emerge, some technically reporting through the State Department, others to other departments, but all effectively reporting back to the NSC and the president. In theory, this will mitigate the kind of bickering between the State Department and NSC that characterized Bush’s first term (a concern hardly limited to the most recent ex-president). And to keep it busy, the State Department has been tasked with rebuilding the U.S. Agency for International Development or an equivalent program for taking reconstruction and development programs, slowly freeing the military from the reconstruction business.
As Clinton heads to Asia, then, the expectations of Asian allies and China of a newfound American appreciation for the Far East might be a bit misplaced. Certainly, this is the first time in a long while that a secretary of state has visited Asia before Europe. But given the role of the vice president and the special envoys, the visit might not reflect policy priorities so much as a desire to ensure that all regions get visits. Clinton’s agenda in each country might not offer an entirely accurate reading of U.S. policy initiatives for the region, either, as much of the policy is still up for review, and her primary responsibility is to demonstrate a new and more interactive face of American foreign policy.
Clinton’s Asia visit is significant largely because it highlights a piece of the evolving Obama foreign policy — a policy that remains centralized under the president via the NSC, and that uses dedicated special envoys and representatives to focus on key trouble spots (and perhaps to avoid some of the interagency bickering that can limit the agencies’ freedom to maneuver). Most importantly, this policy at its core looks to rebuild the sense and reality of American military strength through disengaging from apparently intractable situations, focusing on core competencies rather than reconstruction or nation-building, and calling on allies to take up the slack in security responsibilities. This is what is shaping the first priority for the Obama administration: withdrawal from Iraq not just to demonstrate a different approach than the last president, but also to ensure that the military is ready for use elsewhere.

February 13, 2009
Its Called Strategery

A virtuous leader is one who is clever, cunning, decisive, ruthless and above all, effective.
During the primaries, Obama used his massive fundraising capabilities to pound first Clinton, and then McCain. With Clinton, he expended massive amounts of money in an all out attempt to wrest Pennsylvania from her. He had an outside shot at overcoming her lead, but I think more importantly, he was using his money advantage to bleed her dry and make her win in PA so expensive that it would wound her and inhibit her future path through the primaries. With McCain, Obama pressed hard in a slew of states and used his financial prowess to advertise everywhere from TV to video games, even buying a cable channel and to mobilize a volunteer base estimated to have numbered over 5 million. He was ruthless in the application of his financial advantage, using it like a nail incrusted baseball bat to bludgeon his opponents.
Likewise with the Census power grab. Republicans are crying foul about the administration's move to place the census under direct White House supervision. Its a bit funny to hear GOP folk bleat about the potential that Obama might change the rules, since republicans play to win in just this fashion when it suits them, for example the reapportionment strategy pursued by republicans in Texas. I look at this as another example of Obama's political ruthlessness. The census data is used to apportion legislative districts, allocate millions in government dollars and more.
Manipulation of the census to change the political landscape in a way that could perhaps permanently change the course of the GOP and remove
its ability to be a national party for a generation is a possibility and one I think Obama intends to exploit.... because he can. The GOP base
loves to disparage Obama as an empty suit, calling him Obambi. Keep laughing right on into extinction as a national party. Obama is a strategic thinker. He beat the Clinton machine by having a superior strategic game plan that showed a grasp of the entire primary conflict well beyond Super Tuesday. The census move suggests he is thinking ahead again now to a future with a toothless GOP.
On Judd, Stimulus

Judd Gregg has withdrawn himself from nomination for Commerce Secretary, citing essentially irreconcilable differences on matters of policy. Gregg recused himself from the senate stimulus vote, which perhaps was what prompted the WH to pull the Census from Commerce control. Not an auspicious beginning. Judd falls on his sword and says its basically his fault, he should have known better. I concur. He should have.
Stimulus - (AKA Porkulus)
Two things - when Obama says the bill has no earmarks, he's right. There are no congressionally inserted bits in the bill, put there in some outside of the process manner. Everything in the bill is available for review, which brings me to my second point, which is that there is not going to be a review. I supported Obama, but I don't like the way he's allowing this to go down. The president is about to get a bill authorizing spending nearly a trillion dollars. The bill as of this afternoon had not even been completley distributed to all House members, much less read. They will pass this massive bill tommorow, some 1800 pages long, and no one will have read it thouroughly. That is a recipe for a lot of waste, nor is it thoughtful or prudent. The democrats have the votes to pass it, and can ignore the republicans. Its not necessary to rush this through.
February 11, 2009
US Was on Edge of Economic Armageddon
I was there when the secretary and the chairman of the FederalReserve came those days and talked to members of Congress about what was going on... Here's the facts. We don't even talk about these things.On Thursday, at about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Federal Reserve noticed a tremendous drawdown of money market accounts in the United States to a tune of $550 billion being drawn out in a matter of an hour or two.The Treasury opened up its window to help. They pumped $105 billion into the system and quickly realized that they could not stem the tide. We were having an electronic run on the banks.They decided to close the operation, close down the money accounts,and announce a guarantee of $250,000 per account so there wouldn't be further panic and there. And that's what actually happened.If they had not done that their estimation was that by two o'clockthat afternoon, $5.5 trillion would have been drawn out of the money market system of the United States, would have collapsed the entire economy of the United States, and within 24 hours the world economy would have collapsed.Now we talked at that time about what would have happened if that happened. It would have been the end of our economic system and our political system as we know it.....Half of America is very wary of the TARP bailout and the other half loathes it and nobody understands the logic going into it. Is it just me, or would it have made a whole lot of sense for there to have been some disclosure of these facts to the public so that there was at least some understanding in the body politic that there was an urgency and an emergency. If the economy is still essentially on as shaky a foundation now as it was apparently in Sept. (if Kanjorski is taken at his word) then Obama's warnings of imminent disaster if the recovery bill is not passed swiftly are far from the "fear mongering" its been branded on the right from Redstate to Rush. While you might still disagree with Obama's characterization, in the context revealed by Kanjorski's comments, you can't fault him for pressing the case in those tones.Ya know, we're not any geniuses in economics or finances... We're representatives of people. We ought to take our time, but let the people know this is a very difficult struggle. Somebody threw us into the middle of the Atlantic Ocean without a life raft and we're trying to determine what's the closest shore and whether there's any chance in the world to swim that far. We. Don't. Know.

February 10, 2009
Netflix CEO to President Obama: "Please Raise My Taxes"

My father would say "he must be on dogfood". I am a loyal and happy Netflix subscriber and I happen to think Hastings is a great guy, but this is an inordinately stupid thing to say, and more importantly, he does not really mean it.
Hastings makes a million dollars a year, but the bottom line is that he doesn't really mean he wants the government to take half of that hard earned money right off the top. And while my fellow brethren think Obama wants all the money and the first born too, we are never going to have fifty percent taxation, so it does not even have the cache of being a bold thing to say. He's never going to have to do it, so there is no downside to being ridiculous in this fashion.
Exit thought: Reed, if you're really that pumped to give up half your dough for the good of the country, why don't you just send the $500k my way. I'll put it to good use stimulating the economy.

January 27, 2009
Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the War Against Al Qaeda

Washington’s attention is now zeroing in on Afghanistan. There is talk of doubling U.S. forces there, and preparations are being made for another supply line into Afghanistan — this one running through the former Soviet Union — as an alternative or a supplement to the current Pakistani route. To free up more resources for Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq probably will be accelerated. And there is discussion about whether the Karzai government serves the purposes of the war in Afghanistan. In short, U.S. President Barack Obama’s campaign promise to focus on Afghanistan seems to be taking shape.
We have discussed many aspects of the Afghan war in the past; it is now time to focus on the central issue. What are the strategic goals of the United States in Afghanistan? What resources will be devoted to this mission? What are the intentions and capabilities of the Taliban and others fighting the United States and its NATO allies? Most important, what is the relationship between the war against the Taliban and the war against al Qaeda? If the United States encounters difficulties in the war against the Taliban, will it still be able to contain not only al Qaeda but other terrorist groups? Does the United States need to succeed against the Taliban to be successful against transnational Islamist terrorists? And assuming that U.S. forces are built up in Afghanistan and that the supply problem through Pakistan is solved, are the defeat of Taliban and the disruption of al Qaeda likely?
Al Qaeda and U.S. Goals Post-9/11
The overarching goal of the United States since Sept. 11, 2001, has been to prevent further attacks by al Qaeda in the United States. Washington has used two means toward this end. One was defensive, aimed at increasing the difficulty of al Qaeda operatives to penetrate and operate within the United States. The second was to attack and destroy al Qaeda prime, the group around Osama bin Laden that organized and executed 9/11 and other attacks in Europe. It is this group — not other groups that call themselves al Qaeda but only are able to operate in the countries where they were formed — that was the target of the United States, because this was the group that had demonstrated the ability t o launch intercontinental strikes.
Al Qaeda prime had its main headquarters in Afghanistan. It was not an Afghan group, but one drawn from multiple Islamic countries. It was in alliance with an Afghan group, the Taliban. The Taliban had won a civil war in Afghanistan, creating a coalition of support among tribes that had given the group control, direct or indirect, over most of the country. It is important to remember that al Qaeda was separate from the Taliban; the former was a multinational force, while the Taliban were an internal Afghan political power.
The United States has two strategic goals in Afghanistan. The first is to destroy the remnants of al Qaeda prime — the central command of al Qaeda — in Afghanistan. The second is to use Afghanistan as a base for destroying al Qaeda in Pakistan and to prevent the return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan.
To achieve these goals, Washington has sought to make Afghanistan inhospitable to al Qaeda. The United States forced the Taliban from Afghanistan’s main cities and into the countryside, and established a new, anti-Taliban government in Kabul under President Hamid Karzai. Washington intended to deny al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan by unseating the Taliban government, creating a new pro-American government and then using Afghanistan as a base against al Qaeda in Pakistan.
The United States succeeded in forcing the Taliban from power in the sense that in giving up the cities, the Taliban lost formal control of the country. To be more precise, early in the U.S. attack in 2001, the Taliban realized that the massed defense of Afghan cities was impossible in the face of American air power. The ability of U.S. B-52s to devastate any concentration of forces meant that the Taliban could not defend the cities, but had to withdraw, disperse and reform its units for combat on more favorable terms.
At this point, we must separate the fates of al Qaeda and the Taliban. During the Taliban retreat, al Qaeda had to retreat as well. Since the United States lacked sufficient force to destroy al Qaeda at Tora Bora, al Qaeda was able to retreat into northwestern Pakistan. There, it enjoys the advantages of terrain, superior tactical intelligence and support networks.
Even so, in nearly eight years of war, U.S. intelligence and special operations forces have maintained pressure on al Qaeda in Pakistan. The United States has imposed attrition on al Qaeda, disrupting its command, control and communications and isolating it. In the process, the United States used one of al Qaeda’s operational principles against it. To avoid penetration by hostile intelligence services, al Qaeda has not recruited new cadres for its primary unit. This makes it very difficult to develop intelligence on al Qaeda, but it also makes it impossible for al Qaeda to replace its losses. Thus, in a long war of attrition, every loss imposed on al Qaeda has been irreplaceable, and over time, al Qaeda prime declined dramatically in effectiveness — meaning it has been years since it has carried out an effective operation.
The situation was very different with the Taliban. The Taliban, it is essential to recall, won the Afghan civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal despite Russian and Iranian support for its opponents. That means the Taliban have a great deal of support and a strong infrastructure, and, above all, they are resilient. After the group withdrew from Afghanistan’s cities and lost formal power post-9/11, it still retained a great deal of informal influence — if not control — over large regions of Afghanistan and in areas across the border in Pakistan. Over the years since the U.S. invasion, the Taliban have regrouped, rearmed and increased their operations in Afghanistan. And the conflict with the Taliban has now become a conventional guerrilla war.
The Taliban and the Guerrilla Warfare Challenge
The Taliban have forged relationships among many Afghan (and Pakistani) tribes. These tribes have been alienated by Karzai and the Americans, and far more important, they do not perceive the Americans and Karzai as potential winners in the Afghan conflict. They recall the Russian and British defeats. The tribes have long memories, and they know that foreigners don’t stay very long. Betting on the United States and Karzai — when the United States has sent only 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, and is struggling with the idea of sending another 30,000 troops — does not strike them as prudent. The United States is behaving like a power not planning to win; and, in any event, they would not be much impressed if the Americans were planning to win.
The tribes therefore do not want to get on the wrong side of the Taliban. That means they aid and shelter Taliban forces, and provide them intelligence on enemy movement and intentions. With its base camps and supply lines running from Pakistan, the Taliban are thus in a position to recruit, train and arm an increasingly large force.
The Taliban have the classic advantage of guerrillas operating in known terrain with a network of supporters: superior intelligence. They know where the Americans are, what the Americans are doing and when the Americans are going to strike. The Taliban declines combat on unfavorable terms and strikes when the Americans are weakest. The Americans, on the other hand, have the classic problem of counterinsurgency: They enjoy superior force and firepower, and can defeat anyone they can locate and pin down, but they lack intelligence. As much as technical intelligence from unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites is useful, human intelligence is the only effective long-term solution to defeating an insurgency. In this, the Taliban have the advantage: They have been there longer, they are in more places and they are not going anywhere.
There is no conceivable force the United States can deploy to pacify Afghanistan. A possible alternative is moving into Pakistan to cut the supply lines and destroy the Taliban’s base camps. The problem is that if the Americans lack the troops to successfully operate in Afghanistan, it is even less likely they have the troops to operate in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States could use the Korean War example, taking responsibility for cutting the Taliban off from supplies and reinforcements from Pakistan, but that assumes that the Afghan government has an effective force motivated to engage and defeat the Taliban. The Afghan government doesn’t.
The obvious American solution — or at least the best available solution — is to retreat to strategic Afghan points and cities and protect the Karzai regime. The problem here is that in Afghanistan, holding the cities doesn’t give the key to the country; rather, holding the countryside gives the key to the cities. Moreover, a purely defensive posture opens the United States up to the Dien Bien Phu/Khe Sanh counterstrategy, in which guerrillas shift to positional warfare, isolate a base and try to overrun in it.
A purely defensive posture could create a stalemate, but nothing more. That stalemate could create the foundations for political negotiations, but if there is no threat to the enemy, the enemy has little reason to negotiate. Therefore, there must be strikes against Taliban concentrations. The problem is that the Taliban know that concentration is suicide, and so they work to deny the Americans valuable targets. The United States can exhaust itself attacking minor targets based on poor intelligence. It won’t get anywhere.
U.S. Strategy in Light of al Qaeda’s Diminution
From the beginning, the Karzai government has failed to take control of the countryside. Therefore, al Qaeda has had the option to redeploy into Afghanistan if it chose. It didn’t because it is risk-averse. That may seem like a strange thing to say about a group that flies planes into buildings, but what it means is that the group’s members are relatively few, so al Qaeda cannot risk operational failures. It thus keeps its powder dry and stays in hiding.
This then frames the U.S. strategic question. The United States has no intrinsic interest in the nature of the Afghan government. The United States is interested in making certain the Taliban do not provide sanctuary to al Qaeda prime. But it is not clear that al Qaeda prime is operational anymore. Some members remain, putting out videos now and then and trying to appear fearsome, but it would seem that U.S. operations have crippled al Qaeda.
So if the primary reason for fighting the Taliban is to keep al Qaeda prime from having a base of operations in Afghanistan, that reason might be moot now as al Qaeda appears to be wrecked. This is not to say that another Islamist terrorist group could not arise and develop the sophisticated methods and training of al Qaeda prime. But such a group could deploy many places, and in any case, obtaining the needed skills in moving money, holding covert meetings and the like is much harder than it looks — and with many intelligence services, including those in the Islamic world, on the lookout for this, recruitment would be hard.
It is therefore no longer clear that resisting the Taliban is essential for blocking al Qaeda: al Qaeda may simply no longer be there. (At this point, the burden of proof is on those who think al Qaeda remains operational.)
Two things emerge from this. First, the search for al Qaeda and other Islamist groups is an intelligence matter best left to the covert capabilities of U.S. intelligence and Special Operations Command. Defeating al Qaeda does not require tens of thousands of troops — it requires excellent intelligence and a special operations capability. That is true whether al Qaeda is in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Intelligence, covert forces and airstrikes are what is needed in this fight, and of the three, intelligence is the key.
Second, the current strategy in Afghanistan cannot secure Afghanistan, nor does it materially contribute to shutting down al Qaeda. Trying to hold some cities and strategic points with the number of troops currently under consideration is not an effective strategy to this end; the United States is already ceding large areas of Afghanistan to the Taliban that could serve as sanctuary for al Qaeda. Protecting the Karzai government and key cities is therefore not significantly contributing to the al Qaeda-suppression strategy.
In sum, the United States does not control enough of Afghanistan to deny al Qaeda sanctuary, can’t control the border with Pakistan and lacks effective intelligence and troops for defeating the Taliban.
Logic argues, therefore, for the creation of a political process for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan coupled with a recommitment to intelligence operations against al Qaeda. Ultimately, the United States must protect itself from radical Islamists, but cannot create a united, pro-American Afghanistan. That would not happen even if the United States sent 500,000 troops there, which it doesn’t have anyway.
A Tale of Two Surges
The U.S. strategy now appears to involve trying a surge, or sending in more troops and negotiating with the Taliban, mirroring the strategy used in Iraq. But the problem with that strategy is that the Taliban don’t seem inclined to make concessions to the United States. The Taliban don’t think the United States can win, and they know the United States won’t stay. The Petraeus strategy is to inflict enough pain on the Taliban to cause them to rethink their position, which worked in Iraq. But it did not work in Vietnam. So long as the Taliban have resources flowing and can survive American attacks, they will calculate that they can outlast the Americans. This has been Afghan strategy for centuries, and it worked against the British and Russians.
If it works against the Americans, too, splitting the al Qaeda strategy from the Taliban strategy will be the inevitable outcome for the United States. In that case, the CIA will become the critical war fighter in the theater, while conventional forces will be withdrawn. It follows that Obama will need to think carefully about his approach to intelligence.
This is not an argument that al Qaeda is no longer a threat, although the threat appears diminished. Nor is it an argument that dealing with terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not a priority. Instead, it is an argument that the defeat of the Taliban under rationally anticipated circumstances is unlikely and that a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan will be much more difficult and unlikely than the settlement was in Iraq — but that even so, a robust effort against Islamist terror groups must continue regardless of the outcome of the war with the Taliban.
Therefore, we expect that the United States will separate the two conflicts in response to these realities. This will mean that containing terrorists will not be dependent on defeating or holding out against the Taliban, holding Afghanistan’s cities, or preserving the Karzai regime. We expect the United States to surge troops into Afghanistan, but in due course, the counterterrorist portion will diverge from the counter-Taliban portion. The counterterrorist portion will be maintained as an intense covert operation, while the overt operation will wind down over time. The Taliban ruling Afghanistan is not a threat to the United States, so long as intense counterterrorist operations continue there.
The cost of failure in Afghanistan is simply too high and the connection to counterterrorist activities too tenuous for the two strategies to be linked. And since the counterterror war is already distinct from conventional operations in much of Afghanistan and Pakistan, our forecast is not really that radical.

January 25, 2009
If You Are Too Scared to Criticize Obama For Fear of Being Called Racist, Then Keep Your Mouth Shut

All I have to say is STOP YOUR WHINING AND MAN UP! No excuses, cuz here is the deal. If you got a valid critique to make of Obama's policies or decisions, then make your case. If you're afraid that whatever you have to say will get you called a racist, then keep your frikkin mouth shut, because chances are, whatever you have to say is lame. Because if you have something worth saying and you know how to communicate, it's credibility will be invunerable to serious attack on the basis that it is racist. Period.

January 22, 2009
Vice-President Joe Sixpack or Joe Doofus?
This episode right here makes me wonder what asset the One thought Biden was bringing to the table when he picked him, because his command of nuance, smoothness and class sure was not it. I'm hoping he's got something more going for him thats value added to Team Obama. I consider Dick Cheney to be among the most effective and high performing vice presidents to hold the office. Cheney would never have been out of step with Bush in this way. N-E-V-E-R. I had hoped that Obama would have the benefit of a VP that was every bit as effective as Cheney was for Bush. Cheney had no desire to be the President and spent his time being a very effective second in command. Biden on the other hand I fear, still harbors ambitions for the Oval Office and therefore is liable to remain a gafferic, off key distraction to the smoothness of the One for the remainder of his just started yesterday presidency.
Exit question: Do you think Obama tuned Biden's butt up about this gaffe after the event?

I'll Say It: Rev. Lowery Behaved Like A Jackass

Rick Warren's Invocation: He did not bring it. The guy is a pastor and preacher over a mega church congregation. I expected and wanted a prayer that called on God in a manner that was equal to the moment and the nation's need. I wanted a prayer that would have been the equivalent of a national alter call to service to God and country. As a former member of a mega-church (Word of Faith, pastored by the awesome Bishop Butler) I have heard awesome mega church pastor preaching and prayer. I sooo expected Warren to bring it at that level, but brother had no cadence, no rhythm and as one of my friends remarked, too much emphasis on the "first black president" aspect. A completely underwhelming prayer effort, though I'm sure God heard it just fine.
The Oath: Mr. Chief Justice, you are a constitutional scholar, the chief justice of the court and oh by the way, the 35 words of the oath are in the damn constitution. Is it too much to ask that on such a history making inauguration and your first of many at bat, that you would get that right? Not only did you flub it, but yesterday, out of an "abundance of caution" the oath was re-administered to Obama, something that has happened only twice before. Not quite epic fail, but approaching the frontier. Exit thought on this: how cheesed off are the natural born citizen truthers now? The court summarily rejects all their appeals and the Chief Justice swears The Messiah twice to make sure it sticks!
The Inaugural Composition: I thought the composition created for the inauguration was a wonderful piece of music and Yo-Yo Ma seemed positively full of joy to play it. I thought he gave a real gift to the nation in the performance of the piece. It was a lovely piece of music totally in keeping with the spirit of the event.
The Inaugural Poem: To be fair, I watched the inauguration with my children at their school and I had to take take my son to the bathroom right about the time of the poem, so I didn't get a solid hearing of it and I will look and listen to its rendition again. That said, I'm sorry, it was deadly dull boring, I didn't really understand it and it was spoken in about as deadpan, lifeless and joyless a manner as one could imagine. If Yo-Yo Ma was the epitome of joy in rendition, the poet was the total opposite. I could have been more inspiring than that. Epic Fail.
The Benediction: I didn't mind Lowery's vernacular exposition or the inclusion of the negro anthem so much. It grated my nerves, however I could live with it. But the protest song bit at the end - totally inappropriate to the moment. Old Civil rights coots like him simply cannot let go of racial grievance. He just could not resist the opportunity to tweak the white man at this historical moment. Could not get over himself and the racial history to get out of the way and let this be a moment not just for black American people but for the American people. Complete jackass behavior in my opinion and a real embarrassment to disparage white people in such a blanket way at the inauguration of the 1st black president who got elected with a WHOLE lot of white votes, but he just HAD to slap those folks in the face with his race/victim shtick.
Obama did his level best to let the campaign be about his ideas, not his skin color and at the moment of triumph, Lowery cannot be content to let the victory and the self evident achievement speak for itself. It was unnecessary, unwarranted, and beneath the dignity of the moment. Lowery is an elder, whom we should respect, and he's a civil rights warrior who looked in the face of segregation back in the day. But with all due respect, being an elder ought to mean you have gained some wisdom as well, and that you employ it in your life. The inauguration of the 1st black president was not the time to wear racial grievance on his sleeve or indict white America however gently or mildly some may have regarded it. Some have defended his words as an artful way to honor the occasion and I totally disagree. I think he was simply unable to resist the opportunity to rub it in white America's face just a little and that he in essence gave in to the smaller, less charitable part of his character in doing so. It marred, for me, what was an otherwise very dignified moment of history.
That's my take, what say you? Am I right or way off base? Say it like you feel it.
January 21, 2009
Mr. President: Beautiful

January 20, 2009
Obama Enters the Great Game

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama will be sworn in on Tuesday as president of the United States. Candidate Obama said much about what he would do as president; now we will see what President Obama actually does. The most important issue Obama will face will be the economy, something he did not anticipate through most of his campaign. The first hundred days of his presidency thus will revolve around getting a stimulus package passed. But Obama also is now in the great game of global competition — and in that game, presidents rarely get to set the agenda.
The major challenge he faces is not Gaza; the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is not one any U.S. president intervenes in unless he wants to experience pain. As we have explained, that is an intractable conflict to which there is no real solution. Certainly, Obama will fight being drawn into mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during his first hundred days in office. He undoubtedly will send the obligatory Middle East envoy, who will spend time with all the parties, make suitable speeches and extract meaningless concessions from all sides. This envoy will establish some sort of process to which everyone will cynically commit, knowing it will go nowhere. Such a mission is not involvement — it is the alternative to involvement, and the reason presidents appoint Middle East envoys. Obama can avoid the Gaza crisis, and he will do so.
Obama’s Two Unavoidable Crises
The two crises that cannot be avoided are Afghanistan and Russia. First, the situation in Afghanistan is tenuous for a number of reasons, and it is not a crisis that Obama can avoid decisions on. Obama has said publicly that he will decrease his commitments in Iraq and increase them in Afghanistan. He thus will have more troops fighting in Afghanistan. The second crisis emerged from a decision by Russia to cut off natural gas to Ukraine, and the resulting decline in natural gas deliveries to Europe. This one obviously does not affect the United States directly, but even after flows are restored, it affects the Europeans greatly. Obama therefo re comes into office with three interlocking issues: Afghanistan, Russia and Europe. In one sense, this is a single issue — and it is not one that will wait.
Obama clearly intends to follow Gen. David Petraeus’ lead in Afghanistan. The intention is to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, thereby intensifying pressure on the Taliban and opening the door for negotiations with the militant group or one of its factions. Ultimately, this would see the inclusion of the Taliban or Taliban elements in a coalition government. Petraeus pursued this strategy in Iraq with Sunni insurgents, and it is the likely strategy in Afghanistan.
But the situation in Afghanistan has been complicated by the situation in Pakistan. Roughly three-quarters of U.S. and NATO supplies bound for Afghanistan are delivered to the Pakistani port of Karachi and trucked over the border to Afghanistan. Most fuel used by Western forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and delivered via the same route. There are two crossing points, one near Afghanistan’s Kandahar province at Chaman, Pakistan, and the other through the Khyber Pass. The Taliban have attacked Western supply depots and convoys, and Pakistan itself closed the routes for several days, citing government operations a gainst radical Islamist forces.
Meanwhile, the situation in Pakistan has been complicated by tensions with India. The Indians have said that the individuals who carried out the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack were Pakistanis supported by elements in the Pakistani government. After Mumbai, India made demands of the Pakistanis. While the situation appears to have calmed, the future of Indo-Pakistani relations remains far from clear; anything from a change of policy in New Delhi to new terrorist attacks could see the situation escalate. The Pakistanis have made it clear that a heightened threat from India requires them to shift troops away from the Afghan border and toward the east; a small number of troops already has been shifted.
Apart from the direct impact this kind of Pakistani troop withdrawal would have on cross-border operations by the Taliban, such a move also would dramatically increase the vulnerability of NATO supply lines through Pakistan. Some supplies could be shipped in by aircraft, but the vast bulk of supplies — petroleum, ammunition, etc. — must come in via surface transit, either by truck, rail or ship. Western operations in Afghanistan simply cannot be supplied from the air alone. A cutoff of the supply lines across Pakistan would thus leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan in crisis. Because Washington can’t predict or control the future actions of Pakistan, of India or of terrorists, the United States must find an alternative to the routes through Pakistan.
When we look at a map, the two routes through Pakistan from Karachi are clearly the most logical to use. If those were closed — or even meaningfully degraded — the only other viable routes would be through the former Soviet Union.
- One route, along which a light load of fuel is currently transported, crosses the Caspian Sea. Fuel refined in Armenia is ferried across the Caspian to Turkmenistan (where a small amount of fuel is also refined), then shipped across Turkmenistan directly to Afghanistan and through a small spit of land in Uzbekistan. This route could be expanded to reach either the Black Sea through Georgia or the Mediterranean through Georgia and Turkey (though the additional use of Turkey would require a rail gauge switch). It is also not clear that transports native to the Caspian have sufficient capacity for this.
- Another route sidesteps the issues of both transport across the Caspian and the sensitivity of Georgia by crossing Russian territory above the Caspian. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan (and likely at least a small corner of Turkmenistan) would connect the route to Afghanistan. There are options of connecting to the Black Sea or transiting to Europe through either Ukraine or Belarus.
- Iran could provide a potential alternative, but relations between Tehran and Washington would have to improve dramatically before such discussions could even begin — and time is short.
Many of the details still need to be worked out. But they are largely variations on the two main themes of either crossing the Caspian or transiting Russian territory above it.
Though the first route is already partially established for fuel, it is not clear how much additional capacity exists. To complicate matters further, Turkmen acquiescence is unlikely without Russian authorization, and Armenia remains strongly loyal to Moscow as well. While the current Georgian government might leap at the chance, the issue is obviously an extremely sensitive one for Moscow. (And with Russian forces positioned in Azerbaijan and the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has troops looming over both sides of the vulnerable route across Georgia.) The second option would require crossing Russian territory itself, with a number of options — from connecting to the Black Sea to transiting either Ukraine or Belarus to Europe, or connecting to the Baltic states.
Both routes involve countries of importance to Russia where Moscow has influence, regardless of whether those countries are friendly to it. This would give Russia ample opportunity to scuttle any such supply line at multiple points for reasons wholly unrelated to Afghanistan.
If the West were to opt for the first route, the Russians almost certainly would pressure Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not to cooperate, and Turkey would find itself in a position it doesn’t want to be in — namely, caught between the United States and Russia. The diplomatic complexities of developing these routes not only involve the individual countries included, they also inevitably lead to the question of U.S.-Russian relations.
Even without crossing Russia, both of these two main options require Russian cooperation. The United States must develop the option of an alternative supply route to Pakistan, and in doing so, it must define its relationship with Russia. Seeking to work without Russian approval of a route crossing its “near abroad” will represent a challenge to Russia. But getting Russian approval will require a U.S. accommodation with the country.
The Russian Natural Gas Connection
One of Obama’s core arguments against the Bush administration was that it acted unilaterally rather than with allies. Specifically, Obama meant that the Bush administration alienated the Europeans, therefore failing to build a sustainable coalition for the war. By this logic, it follows that one of Obama’s first steps should be to reach out to Europe to help influence or pressure the Russians, given that NATO has troops in Afghanistan and Obama has said he intends to ask the Europeans for more help there.
The problem with this is that the Europeans are passing through a serious crisis with Russia, and that Germany in particular is involved in trying to manage that crisis. This problem relates to natural gas. Ukraine is dependent on Russia for about two-thirds of the natural gas it uses. The Russians traditionally have provided natural gas at a deep discount to former Soviet republics, primarily those countries Russia sees as allies, such as Belarus or Armenia. Ukraine had received discounted natural gas, too, until the 2004 Orange Revolution, when a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. At that point, the Russians began demanding full payment. Given the subsequent rises in global energy prices, that left Ukraine in a terrible situation — which of course is exactly where Moscow wanted it.
The Russians cut off natural gas to Ukraine for a short period in January 2006, and for three weeks in 2009. Apart from leaving Ukraine desperate, the cutoff immediately affected the rest of Europe, because the natural gas that goes to Europe flows through Ukraine. This put the rest of Europe in a dangerous position, particularly in the face of bitterly cold weather in 2008-2009.
The Russians achieved several goals with this. First, they pressured Ukraine directly. Second, they forced many European states to deal with Moscow directly rather than through the European Union. Third, they created a situation in which European countries had to choose between supporting Ukraine and heating their own homes. And last, they drew Berlin in particular — since Germany is the most dependent of the major European states on Russian natural gas — into the position of working with the Russians to get Ukraine to agree to their terms. (Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Germany last week to discuss this directly with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.)
The Germans already have made clear their opposition to expanding NATO to Ukraine and Georgia. Given their dependency on the Russians, the Germans are not going to be supporting the United States if Washington decides to challenge Russia over the supply route issue. In fact, the Germans — and many of the Europeans — are in no position to challenge Russia on anything, least of all on Afghanistan. Overall, the Europeans see themselves as having limited interests in the Afghan war, and many already are planning to reduce or withdraw troops for budgetary reasons.
It is therefore very difficult to see Obama recruiting the Europeans in any useful manner for a confrontation with Russia over access for American supplies to Afghanistan. Yet this is an issue he will have to address immediately.
The Price of Russian Cooperation
The Russians are prepared to help the Americans, however — and it is clear what they will want in return.
At minimum, Moscow will want a declaration that Washington will not press for the expansion of NATO to Georgia or Ukraine, or for the deployment of military forces in non-NATO states on the Russian periphery — specifically, Ukraine and Georgia. At this point, such a declaration would be symbolic, since Germany and other European countries would block expansion anyway.
The Russians might also demand some sort of guarantee that NATO and the United States not place any large military formations or build any major military facilities in the former Soviet republics (now NATO member states) of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (A small rotating squadron of NATO fighters already patrols the skies over the Baltic states.) Given that there were intense anti-government riots in Latvia and Lithuania last week, the stability of these countries is in question. The Russians would certainly want to topple the pro-Western Baltic governments. And anything approaching a formal agreement between Russia and the United States on the matter could quickly destabilize the Baltics, in addition to very much weakening the NATO alliance.
Another demand the Russians probably will make — because they have in the past — is that the United States guarantee eventual withdrawal from any bases in Central Asia in return for Russian support for using those bases for the current Afghan campaign. (At present, the United States runs air logistics operations out of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.) The Russians do not want to see Central Asia become a U.S. sphere of influence as the result of an American military presence.
Other demands might relate to the proposed U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in the Czech Republic and Poland.
We expect the Russians to make variations on all these demands in exchange for cooperation in creating a supply line to Afghanistan. Simply put, the Russians will demand that the United States acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Americans will not want to concede this — or at least will want to make it implicit rather than explicit. But the Russians will want this explicit, because an explicit guarantee will create a crisis of confidence over U.S. guarantees in the countries that emerged from the Soviet Union, serving as a lever to draw these countries into the Russian orbit. U.S. acquiescence on the point potentially would have ripple effects in the rest of Europe, too.
Therefore, regardless of the global financial crisis, Obama has an immediate problem on his hands in Afghanistan. He has troops fighting there, and they must be supplied. The Pakistani supply line is no longer a sure thing. The only other options either directly challenge Russia (and ineffectively at that) or require Russian help. Russia’s price will be high, particularly because Washington’s European allies will not back a challenge to Russia in Georgia, and all options require Russian cooperation anyway. Obama’s plan to recruit the Europeans on behalf of American initiatives won’t work in this case. Obama does not want to start his administration with making a massive concession to Russia, but he cannot afford to leave U.S. forces in Afghanistan without supplies. He can hope that nothing happens in Pakistan, but that is up to the Taliban and other Islamist groups more than anyone else — and betting on their goodwill is not a good idea.
Whatever Obama is planning to do, he will have to deal with this problem fast, before Afghanistan becomes a crisis. And there are no good solutions. But unlike with the Israelis and Palestinians, Obama can’t solve this by sending a special envoy who appears to be doing something. He will have to make a very tough decision. Between the economy and this crisis, we will find out what kind of president Obama is.
And we will find out very soon.

January 7, 2009
Optics

I like the way this looks, I like the message the lunch conveys, I appreciate Bush's gesture in hosting it and his comments to the press which I regarded as quite sincere. If only that the spirit of this event would permeate all of Washington and the country.
January 5, 2009
Random Reactions
Doofus move #1. In a fit of greedy, self serving ambition, Burris accepts Blago's appointment to the senate seat vacated by Obama, demonstrating that in the service of his own ends, he is absolutely prone to throw good sense out the window and let someone play him for their own political goals. Who wants that in a senator? He willingly allows Blago to put him in the middle of this mess, neatly diverting the conversation away from Blago's failings to an irrevelant conversation about the fairness or not of seating him. The cherry on top of that? The nauseating display of the man's malleable situational ethics. A few weeks ago, he was calling for Blago's head along with the rest. Now, he has no opinion on the governor's troubles. He's all "Whats your governor got to do with me? I'm not trying to hear that see". Outrageous.
Doofus move #2: Co-siging on the ridicoulous race card playing of former Black Panther, now politically senile grey panther Bobby Rush, Burris goes on the cable shows to insinuate that a refusal to seat him would be an example of racially unfair treatment. The insanely idiotic racial irony of this soap opera of petty politics has my blood at high boil. Obama just won the presidency running from the land of Lincoln with a campaign that tried its very best to talk to America beyond Obama's skin color. Now here comes Burris, monkey signifying bout how they better let him come sit in the big Senate house, blatantly insinuating racial animus where none, zero, zilch, de nada, exists if he is not seated. Here the whole country is on a racial harmony high having elected a black president and what is Burris doing? Blatantly playing the race card to serve his own personal lust for power, position and prestige. Its not subtle, its not smart, it lacks integrity and it spits all over the historicity of the illinois senate seat from which Obama has made history. Epic buzz kill.
Burris does not deserve to be seated because he's demonstrated that he's venal, possesses situational, two faced ethics, still works with a 2oth century racial politics toolbox that has outlived its utility and is stupid enough to tarnish his own reputation by helping an obviuosly corrupt governor lay down political cover fire to suppress the well deserved scrutiny coming his way. The people of Illinois don't want this zero for a senator I am quite sure.
On Obama and Panetta: Leon Panetta to head the CIA? Huh? Last I checked, Panetta was a competent enough manager, but no spook. Nothing wrong with being a career politician if you're any good at it, but I don't like the idea of a guy who's never been a spook a day in his life, with no professional national security street cred to speak of leading the CIA. It totally smacks of a pander to the left who didn't want any body who smelled of the Jack Bauer tactics of the current administration in the slightest. I don't like it. Obama was doing a good job ticking off the left, and I would have preferred his CIA pick be an appropriately effective spook pro. Panetta's choice feels like reflexive political pandering to the idea that we have to play nice on national security, even though we live in a world where no one else does. I assume the CIA's job is to do the nation's dirty work in the dark and you hope that there is some moral speed governor in place. I don't mind Obama placating the left, but I'd prefer he not do it by appointing a non spook to head CIA
December 26, 2008
I'm Okay With That

Before the rise of Obama, that display would have been all rap, pop culture icons. Now, across the country perhaps, such displays will have the balance I saw the other day. On the one hand, rappers and pop icons but now also, the President of the United States.
I'm okay with that.
What signs and portents of the Obama effect on the culture are you seeing?
December 19, 2008
Obama: Supernatural
All I got to say is, don't front. Because Obama has demonstrated his preternatural powers for all, and you better recognize. When did he make this demonstration? During the primaries, he predicted the future with keen accuracy:
Fast forward to the present:
Hillary laughed at the Obamamessiah. Now she does his bidding.
Soooo, mock the "One" at your peril. His powers are real.

December 15, 2008
SCOTUS Kills "Natural Born Citizen" Arguments Against Obama
08A469 WROTNOWSKI, CORT V. BYSIEWICZ, CT SEC. OF STATE
The application for stay and/or injunction addressed to Justice Scalia and
referred to the Court is denied.
Today's release of SCOTUS's denial (without comment) of this case occurs cotemporaneously with the meeting of the Electoral College electors today across the country to certify the electoral votes of the states. These two events, both occuring largely out of the public and media's eye and attention, essentially ensure Obama's ascendency to the Oval Office as the 44th President of the United States.
The Court has removed the last potentially viable constitutional challenge, and the Electoral College with its votes today will firmly cement Obama as the President Elect and invest him with the commensurate responsibility and authority granted that title by the Constitution of the United States.

December 10, 2008
The Search for a Decent Obama Impersonator Is Over
December 9, 2008
Conservative Supreme Court Justices Stalking Obama
If you're not the suspicious type, then there's nothing to see here. As one of Donofrio's commenter's pointed out;
On the other hand, if the timing of this referral by Scalia strikes you as odd and suspicious, then you might conclude that this special order crisis appears to be actively and aggressively pushed forward by conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia. That is the other conclusion to be drawn from the proceedings and orders history of the two cases.
No. 08A469 | ||||
Title: |
| |||
Docketed: | ||||
Lower Ct: | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Case Nos.: | (SC 18264) |
~~~Date~~~ | ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
Nov 25 2008 | Application (08A469) for stay and/or injunction, submitted to Justice Ginsburg. |
Nov 26 2008 | Application (08A469) denied by Justice Ginsburg. |
Nov 29 2008 | Application (08A469) refiled and submitted to Justice Scalia. |
Dec 8 2008 | DISTRIBUTED for Conference of December 12, 2008. |
Dec 8 2008 | Application (08A469) referred to the Court by Justice Scalia. |
Dec 9 2008 | Supplemental brief of applicant Cort Wrotnowski filed. (Distributed) |
and the earlier Donofrio case:
No. 08A407 | ||||
Title: |
| |||
Docketed: | ||||
Lower Ct: | Supreme Court of New Jersey |
Case Nos.: | (AM-0153-08T2 at the New Jersey Appellate Division without a docket number) |
~~~Date~~~ | ~~~~~~~Proceedings and Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
Nov 3 2008 | Application (08A407) for stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice Souter. |
Nov 6 2008 | Application (08A407) denied by Justice Souter. |
Nov 14 2008 | Application (08A407) refiled and submitted to Justice Thomas. |
Nov 19 2008 | DISTRIBUTED for Conference of December 5, 2008. |
Nov 19 2008 | Application (08A407) referred to the Court by Justice Thomas. |
Nov 26 2008 | Supplemental brief of applicant Leo C. Donofrio filed. (Distributed) |
Dec 1 2008 | Letter from applicant dated November 22, 2008, received. |
Dec 8 2008 | Application (08A407) denied by the Court. |
The fundamental legal argument in both cases is the same, to wit: Obama is not eligible to stand for the Presidency because his dual citizenship status at birth renders him not a "natural born citizen' per Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution.
The difference between the two briefs is simply that the second had more preparation time and is considered procedurally cleaner and better argued by its author.
Timing wise, Scalia sends this to the full court for review on the Friday before the Electoral College is due to meet. Only four Justices are required to grant a hearing and there are four conservative votes on the court in Alito, Stevens, Thomas and Scalia. It is entirely possible that Friday afternoon, the Supreme Court could issue an emergency stay of the Electoral College pending oral arguments on this case. Donofrio will accompany Cort Wrotnowski to Washington D.C. tomorrow where both will be available for comment at 11:00 AM on the steps of the Supreme Court.
We may not have missed the political apocalypse after all.
